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Abstract: Seen as a clash between Eastern (Islamic /Arabian) and Western (European/ Christian) 
civilization and culture, Africa may be expected not to be that much of a target for terrorism and terrorist 
organizations. Recently however, the clash of civilization thesis appears to have been debunked by the 
French President, Francoise Hollande, following the Bataclan incident. In spite of this claim however, 
mainstream terrorism is still largely seen as an attempt to get even with the West and their collaborators/ 
allies, for perceived wrongs or grievances; whatever they may be! It is largely in pursuit of the later 
objective that African countries and societies have become not just vulnerable but indeed targets of terrorist 
organizations and activities. This paper focuses on terrorism and terrorist activities in the various sub-
regions of Africa since the end of the Cold War in 1989-East Africa and the Horn, North Africa, Central 
Africa and the Sahel region, Southern Africa and West Africa. Our intention is to determine the motivations, 
objectives and expected outcome of the terrorist activities on the developmental trajectory of the countries 
and societies affected. Using the instrumentalist and constrictivist models of conflict analysis in plural 
societies, the work relies heavily on secondary data and collections of security and intelligence agencies to 
reach its conclusions. 
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Introduction 
It is axiomatic that the major inducement to 
terrorism and terrorist activities is to pressure 
governments by presenting them as ineffectual or 
incapable of guaranteeing national security.  This is 
usually with the aim of forcing such governments 
or other public authorities to abandon certain policy 
persuits or adopt other policies that suit the 
interests of the terrorist organization or 
organizations.  Apart from national security, 
another major raison d’etre of government is to 
induce and sustain development in the domestic 
environment. Because of this, terrorism also aims 
to disrupt, frustrate or stymie development in the 
areas targeted. 
Since these two are the major duties of government 
in Africa, as elsewhere, if terrorist organizations 
succeed in compromising them, or to pressure 
governments to adopt measures that are clearly 
detrimental to the interests of the greater majority 
of their populations, so as to guarantee the former-
national security and sustained development, then, 
they, the terrorist organizations, would have 
achieved their aims and objectives. 
Focusing on the various sub-regions of Africa that 
have seen sustained terrorists activities since the 
1990’s, our intension is to determine: 
i. The major objectives of the terrorist 
organization(s) there; 
ii. The security and developmental 
implications of those objectives; 
iii. The prospects for the achievement of 
terrorist objectives; and 
iv. An assessment of government’s 
disposition and capability of either giving 
in to, or frustrating the security and 
developmental aims of terrorism in the 
various sub-regions of Africa where 
significant terrorist activities are 
prevalent. 
To do this, there may be need to attempt a brief 
conceptual understanding of terrorism, security and 
development. Because so much has already been 
said on these concepts in terms of definitions and 
conceptualizations, and because, as social science 
terminologies, no precise definitions, ever suffice, 
we shall proceed with just brief conceptualizations 
to enable the appreciation of the analysis that 
would follow. 
Terrorism, A Conceptualization: Terrorism has 
been conceived in very many different ways. 
Indeed, there appear to be as many 
conceptualizations of the phenomenon as there are 
commentators. For N. Chomsky, “terror is the 
calculated use of violence or threat of violence to 
attain political or religious ideological goals 
through intimidation, coercion, or instilling fear…” 
(1)
 Lending creadence to the coercive and 
intimidating tendency of terrorism, J. Cilliers 
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conceives terrorism as “the unlawful or threatened 
use of unlawful violence against individuals or 
property to coerce and intimidate governments or 
societies for political objectives”.(2) The present 
writer has also indicated elsewhere that terrorism 
can be conceived as, “life threatening actions 
perpetrated by politically. Motivated self-appointed 
sub-state groups”, to ‘right’ perceived political 
‘wrongs’ or at least attempt to get even with those 
accused of sponsoring such ‘wrongs’.(3) In an 
attempt to determine the evolution and root of the 
concept of terrorism, David C. Rapoport identifies 
government activities in the French Revolution as 
having produced “the concept and vocabulary of 
terror”.(4) He went ahead to identity the Russian 
Narodnaya Volya (The People’s Will) as being the 
first group to describe itself as terrorists in 1879. 
With the antecedents of the Narodnaya Volya, the 
conception of terrorism as non-state or sub-state 
group or organization intent on changing the status 
quo through violent means appears reinforced. 
Another means through which terrorists attempt to 
change the status-quo is what Ogaba D. Oche refers 
to as “great fear”, in which, according to him, one 
fears for his or her life.  The person who carries out 
the aggression or creates a condition of great fear is 
then seen as a terrorist.  Quoting the Merriam 
Webster Dictionary, he defines terrorism is “the 
systematic use of violence, terror and intimidation 
to achieve an end”.  He then submits that terrorism 
can be construed to mean “the systematic use of 
terror, or unpredictable violence against 
governments / publics or individuals to attain 
political objectives”.(5) In other words, according to 
him, terror is unpredictable violence. 
In an attempt to try and overcome the perceptual 
diversity in arriving at a general conception of 
terrorism, some commentators have taken to 
highlighting its defining features and 
characteristics, its fundamentally political nature, 
the surprise use of violence against apparently 
random targets and the targeting of innocent non-
state actors.
(6)
 All these are intended to create fear 
and ultimate violence as a means to an end.  The 
end being to   persuade, coerce or intimidate 
governments / publics to abandoned preferred 
policy options for those the terrorists wish to 
impose. The question remains, to what extent are 
they succeeding or prone to succeed on the African 
scene, as elsewhere, by trying to compromise 
national security and developmental trajectory of 
the various countries in the various sub-regions 
being targeted.  Before we proceed, let us 
conceptualise security and development. 
The Concept of Security 
A dictionary definition sees security as “freedom or 
protection from danger or worry”. Security could 
also mean measures taken to guarantee the safety 
of a country, person or a thing of value.  We thus 
have national security and or personal/individual 
security referring to the safety, freedom or 
protection of the nation and or an individual from 
danger or threat of danger. 
Security in this sense is a public good which is 
ultimately provided by the Almighty God; but 
which Governments pledge to provide to their 
subjects, as representatives or agents of God. This 
is corroborated by the scriptures when in Romans 
13:1b  the Bible declares… “the powers that be are 
ordained of God”. It follows that rulers and 
governments have an obligation both to God who 
ordained them, and to their subjects, not only to 
provide but to guarantee the security of both the 
state and that of the individual. 
Terrorists and terrorist organizations appear 
conscious of this sacred duty of governments, 
hence their penchant to try every thing they can to 
present governments as derelict in that duty.  This 
is with a view to pressuring such governments to 
ultimately succumb to their wishes, by adopting 
their preferred option of societal order, or to simply 
discredit the government, and possibly force it out, 
for a preferred one. 
Perhaps, we should indicate another aspect of 
security which terrorists appear also to be 
conscious of: its nature as a public good. According 
to Andrew Reeve, a public good is “any good that 
if supplied to anybody is necessarily supplied to 
everybody, and from whose benefits it is 
impossible or impracticable to exclude anybody”.(7) 
A major characteristic of a public good is that each 
individual’s consumption leads to no subtraction 
from any other individual’s consumption of that 
good.  National defence or national security is a 
typical example of a public good. No public 
authority or government can or should restrict 
national security to particular individuals or certain 
sections of the commonwealth; nor can the 
provision of national defence or security to some 
individuals or sections of the polity necessarily 
subtract or diminish its provision to the other 
sections or individuals. 
To this end, governing authorities are under 
obligation to provide security to every law-abiding 
citizen, and to the entire realm over which such 
authority extends.  So, any compromise of national 
security in any part of the commonwealth or within 
or over any community of the inhabitants, amounts 
to a comprise of national security over the entire 
realm.  Terrorist organizations are aware of this, so 
when they succeed in jeopardizing the security of a 
part of a state or other political units, they would 
have succeeded in embarrassing the government.  
When this happens, they then feel emboldened to 
now dictate terms to such government, or at least 
expect it to come sueing for peace, and be prepared 
to accept their, i.e the terrorists’ terms.  Has this 
been or will over the case in Africa? This analysis 
intends to unravel that.  Before we proceed, we 
look at the concept of development. 
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Development A Conceptualization: Development 
is a multidimensional process that normally 
connotes change from a less to a more desirable 
state.
(8)
 There is some argument as to whether 
development; as a normative concept, is related to 
time, place and circumstance or whether it can be 
reduced to “one universally applicable formula”. It 
is however generally accepted that increased 
economic efficiency, expansion of productive 
capacity of the nation’s economy, and 
technological advances are necessary conditions for 
a sustained long term developmental phenomenon 
in any social formation. 
Without delving much into the dialectics of the 
concept of development, it must be stated that 
development also connotes the fulfillment of the 
necessary conditions for the realization of the 
potential of human personality, which translates 
into reduction in poverty, inequality, and 
unemployment.
(9)
 Conscious of this, terrorist 
organizations deliberately target infrastructures and 
other structures in society put in place to help meet 
these requirements – dams, oil installations, tourist 
sites, hotels, important government buildings, 
universities and other educational institutions etc. 
The aim is to cripple not just the potential for 
economic development, but every effort 
government is making or will make to ensure 
reduction of poverty, inequality or unemployment 
in the society targeted.  Terrorist organizations 
once gain hope by so-doing, they can force 
governments to acquiesce to their demands, 
whatever they are, and however bizarre they may 
appear. 
As we focus on the various sub-regions of Africa 
that have seen terrorist activities in recent years, 
our intention is to determine the objectives of those 
organizations, and to what extent they can be 
achieved through terrorist atrocities. 
EAST AFRICA AND THE HORN 
For the purposes of our analysis here, East Africa 
and the Horn or what is usually referred to as “the 
greater Horn of Africa,
(10)
 comprise such states as 
the Suden, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Somalia, Djibouti and 
Kenya. In spite of this categorization however, we 
must include Uganda, Rwanda and Burundi 
because of our concern with classical East Africa, 
not just the Horn.  Major terrorist organizations 
operating in this area/region include al-Shabaab, 
the Mombasa Republican Council (MRC), the 
Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) and the Lord’s 
Resistance Army (LRA). 
Without much equivocation, one can say that the 
major impetus for terrorism in this general area 
issues from Somalia.  This is not to discountenance 
the fact that the Sudan has had a long and well-
documented history as a sanctuary for terrorist 
activities.
(11)
 We see that during the regime of 
Hassan al Turabi, Osama bin Laden was provided 
sanctuary in the Sudan for much of the 1990’s. It is 
common knowledge that it was consequent upon 
his arrangement with Turabi that bin Laden was 
able to build a truly global network of terrorist 
contacts throughout the Islamic world.  Although 
bin Laden was eventually forced to flee the Sudan 
in 1996, essentially as a result of U.S. pressure, and 
the loss of his benefactor Turabi, the policies of 
Sudanese President, Omar al Bashir did not help 
maters either. His support and sponsorship of the 
Islamic Janjaweed Militia’s campaign of ethnic 
cleansing in Sudan’s Southern region provided an 
atmosphere conducive for terrorist activity.  
Besides, as noted by Rabasa et al, the situation in 
the Jebel Kurish Mountain range in Sudan’s north 
eastern territory, where there are “no real Sudanese 
government or army control”…(12) made it easy for 
terrorists to slip through the cracks into the hills to 
train, rest and build up the spirit of jihad. 
Notwithstanding, it is the Somalia scenario that 
gives the background and major motivation for 
transnational terrorism in the region.  In the mid 
20
th
 century, new Islamic reform movements 
emerged throughout the Muslim world, including 
Somalia. This movement began to advocate for 
strict adherence to the written sources of Islam-the 
Koran, Hadith, and what is referred to as 
“authoritative comments”.(13) The motive for these 
movements was to correct what was seen as 
aberrations imposed by politicians of eastern, 
western or non-aligned  positions of the late 
colonial rule and the cold war era.  The term 
“political Islam” is believed to have gained 
currency and relevance within this context.
(14)
 The 
term also refers to those involved in religious 
reform in the way mentioned above.  Political 
Islam therefore covers social reform movements, as 
well as militant or so called ‘Jihadi’ groups.  
According to Markus Hoehne, the boundaries 
between these various and often ideologically 
heterogeneous strands of political Islam are 
blurred, such that any clear-cut moderate Vs 
extremist, Sufi Vs Salafi, nationalist Vs globalist 
separation could be simply misleading. 
From analytical puspective, it could be argued that 
the only common goal of all political Islamists 
appears to be the urge or resolve to erect Islamic 
states and a new caliphate in which the divine law-
Sharia, rules. Strategies to reach this objective 
however differ markedly in the various regions.  
Before we attempt an understanding of the 
strategies adopted by the main terrorist group in the 
Horn, it is important that we gain some insight into 
the nature and process of Islamic proselytization of 
Somalia. 
Islam reached Somalia in the early 7
th
 century AD. 
It was concentrated along the coast, and the 
caravan routes inland.  Here sultanetes came into 
existence between the 12
th
 and the 19
th
 centuries – 
Itat, Adal in the north, and later Ajuuraan in the 
south.
(15)
 Until the 20
th
 C. Somali Islam was 
characterized by the Sufi tradition.  The Sufi 
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‘orders’ usually incorporated local traditions into 
their system of belief. 
Until the mid 20
th
 century, the Sufi tradition in 
Somalia went unchallenged.  But an obvious 
religious and political transformation of Islam in 
Somalia began in the 1950’s and 60’s. Egypt and 
the Sudan began to increase their influence on 
Somalia territories.  This was instigated partly by 
the British colonizers in the form of scholarships 
for Somalia students and establishment of schools 
in colonial Somalia. Soon, a modern religious elite 
came into existence in the late colonial and early 
post-colonial Somalia, influenced as it were by the 
ideas of the Muslim Brotherhood, founded in Egypt 
in the 1920’s. 
About the same time, Wahhabi, Islam propagated 
by Saudi-Arabian rulers began to gain ground in 
the Islamic world, transmitted, as it were, to 
Somalia through oil workers, students and other 
migrants to the Gulf states.  From the 1970’s, these 
new forms of Islam, as different from the Sufi 
tradition, began to feed into the emerging 
opposition against the military regime of Gen. 
Muhammed Siyad Barre (1969 – 1991). 
Reformist groups, like Ahda, Nahda and Wahda, 
aiming to purge Islam of ‘impure’ indigenous and 
Sufi practices and beliefs contunied to operate but 
underground due to the reppressive actions of the 
Siyad Barre government.  They however came to 
the open from 1991, buoyed by the civil war, state 
collapse, and international interventions that 
attended the ouster of the Siyad Barre regime. 
The first effective political Islamist movement was 
Al-Ittihat Al-Islamiyya (AIAI). Founded in 1984, it 
engaged in the civil war, and provided an 
alternative political order by founding a caliphate 
in South-Western Somalia - in Luuq, Gedo, region. 
Along side AIAI, a number of reformist Islamist 
movements were also active. Groups close to the 
Muslim Brotherhood, such as Al-Islah was 
prominent in this regard. There was also Wahhabi – 
oriented groups such as Al-Ictisam which sought 
social and political transformation in Somalia, shun 
of violence.  But Sufi groups such as Ahlu-Sunna 
Wal Jamaa kept a more, “traditionalist” profile, 
entering the political fray in 1991 as a partner of 
the warloard Mohammed Fara Aideed, who 
presented himself as a ‘traditionalist’.(16) The Sufis 
were to subsequently abandon their traditionalist 
approach when they and the tombs of the venerated 
Sheikhs were attacked by Al-Shabaab.
(17)
 
This brings us to the main focus of our discussion 
here: Al-Shabaab. Harakat Shabaab al-Mujahidin, 
al-Shabaab, Shabaab, The Youth, Mujahidin al-
Shabaab Movement, Mujahedeen Youth 
Movement, Mujahidin Youth Movement are the 
various nomenclatures associated with the terror 
group operating from Somalia and the greater Horn 
of Africa that we know and address as al-Shabaab.  
Formed around 2003 as a small cell, in the south of 
the country, but also supported by activists from 
the north, al-Shabaab engaged in the dirty war in 
Mogadishu of the 1990’s. Still a rather small 
nucleus of hardcore Islamists, al-Shabaab joined 
the Islamic Courts in 2006. It was while fighting 
against the Ethopian military intervention in 
Somalia between December 2006 and January 
2009 that al-Shabaab became the most powerful, 
and in the estimation of many Somalis, a legitimate 
military and political actor.
(18)
 According to Anita 
Peresin and Vlasta Zekulic, this terrorist 
organization took control over most of Southern 
Somalia
(19)
 in 2006. In spite of this however, in 
December 2006, Somali government and Ethiopian 
military forces managed to suppress al Shabaab 
during the two week war. It subsequently 
regrouped, and continued with activities in 
Southern, Central Somalia, as well as in north 
Kenya. Al-Shabaab guerilla and terrorist activities 
were aimed primarily against the Transitional 
Federal Government of Somalia (TFG), including 
its allies-the African Union Peace Operation and 
non-governmental humanitarian organizations. In 
other words, Al-Shabaab has been fighting to 
sustain the atmosphere of chaos occasioned by state 
failure. 
Soon after formally aligning with Al-Qaeda in 
2008, al-Shabaab equally decleared its partisanship 
to the global Jihad against the West. The public 
announcement of merger of jihad from the Horn of 
Africa with the one led by al-Qaeda,
(20)
 in February 
2010, saw an intensification of al-Shabaab 
operations.  It equally signified a change of focus 
from local /national to global goals, attacks, 
planning and targeting system. Rather than 
focusing on operations against the Transitional 
Federal Government of Somalia (TFG) as we saw 
earlier, the link with Al-Qaeda meant the 
abandonment of querrilla warefare and the 
adoption of al-Qaeda’s main tactics – use of suicide 
bombers against government buildings, dignitaries, 
UN and African Union targets and other non-
governmental organizations (NGOs), throughout 
the country and abroad. 
This volte-face did not appear to go down well with 
some interests within the organization. These 
interests coalesced around the different clans 
operating within the terror organization.  
Disagreements on demands to operate outside 
Somalia, and the adoption of some al-Qaeda tactics 
such as suicide attacks have worked to compromise 
internal cohesion.  It is observed that currently, two 
main strands are discernible in al-Shabaab 
operations: one whose interest lies in local fight 
against the TFG, resentful of global jihad, and the 
other supporting alliance with al-Qaeda, and 
adopting its ideology, goals and operational 
mechanisms. 
It must however be noted that the alliance with al-
Qaeda increased popular support for al-Shabaab. 
Prior to that alliance, al-Shabaah consisted mostly 
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of local fighters and sympathizers arriving from the 
‘Somali Diaspora’, particularly Kenya.(21) But, 
according to V.Soria, with the alliance, al-Shabaab 
began to attract foreign jihadists and radicalized 
individuals from the Near East, Europe and the 
United States.
(22)
 It was with these that al-Shabaab 
mounted the Westgate Shopping Mall attack in 
Nairobi, Kenya, and the Gariassa University 
Killings in which 72 and 148 people respectively, 
were murdered. This is in addition to numerous 
attacks on government buildings, hotels, tourist 
centres, UN and AU personnel and soliders in its 
more traditional objective of trying to derail the 
transitional Federal Government. In all these, al-
Shabaab has, and continues to exact a great toll on 
the political economy of the Somali nation, in 
particular, and the greater Horn in general. 
As noted by OECD, developing countries such as 
Algeria, Burundi, Nigeria, Egypt, Somalia, and 
Congo which rank high with respect to the number 
of terrorism incidents, have in recent history been 
spending on average, about 30 percent of their 
GDP on efforts to combat terrorism and other 
threats to national security.
(23)
 This no doubt makes 
it difficult for countries such as Somalia to meet 
other pressing socio-economic and political 
necessities for her citizens. In spite of this, can we 
say that al-Shabaab has the potential to make good 
its aims and goal of overthrowing the Somalia 
government and, establishing an Islamic Caliphate, 
while continuing to participate in global jihad? We 
shall come back to this when we have considered 
other sub-regions and their terrorist threats. 
NORTH AFRICA 
Unlike Somalia and the Horn, the North African 
“region does not appear to harbor” one dominant 
terrorist organization. Instead, we have major 
terrorist organizations operating in various 
countries in the region – Al-Qaeda in the Lands of 
the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) in Algeria, Muslim 
Brotherhood and Ga’mat al-Islamiya in Egypt, 
Islamic Salvation Front in Algeria, Salafist Group 
for Preaching and Combat (GSPC) in Algeria and 
across the sahel region, Libyan Islamic Fighting 
Group in Libya, Moroccan Islamic Combatant in 
Morocco, and so forth.
(24)
 Despite this mix 
however, having been infiltrated and subsequently 
affiliated with al-Qaeda, the group, Al-Qaeda in the 
Lands of the Islamic Maghreb appears to have 
emerged as the dominant terrorist group in this 
region.  As such, we might as well focus on this 
group to catch a glimpse of the major objectives, 
and strategies of terrorism and terrorists on the 
region. AQIM is an Algerian jihadist group of 
Sunni Muslims.  It was founded in 1998 under the 
name Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat 
(GSPC). A fraction of the biggest and most active 
Algerian terrorist group-Armed Islamic Group, the 
GSPC started its activities as traditional anti-
colonial insurgent group. Rather than disband after 
the French Departure in 1962, the GSPC continued 
violent action against the post-colonial regimes 
which it accused of being too pro-European. 
At its foundation, the primary targets of the GSPC 
remained members of Algerian security forces and 
government buildings. The aim was to overthrow 
the government and establish an Islamic caliphate.  
But in a move rather reminiscent of the Al-Shabaab 
scenario, a formal alliance was established with al-
Qaeda in September 2006,
(25)
 and it proceeded to 
rename itself Al-Qaeda in the Lands of Islamic 
Maghreb-AQIM, in January 2007. Once again like 
al-Shabaab, there were some reservations within 
the organization regarding the merger. But the 
overriding necessity for organizational and 
financial survival as well as for recruitment of new 
members after heavy losses it suffered in the hands 
of antiterrorist security forces, made the merger 
imperative. With this merger, according to 
J.Master, the former fight against the government 
was replaced with a fight against the West and their 
interests in Africa.
(26)
 To give vent to this new 
objective, AQIM conducted attacks at the end of 
2006 and beginning of 2007 on foreigners working 
in the energy plant in Algeria.  In December 2007, 
UN members in Algeria were attacked. In February 
2008, it was the turn of the Israeli embassy in 
Nouakchott Mauritania, while in May 2009, AQIM 
claimed responsibility for the murder of  British 
hostages and a US missionary in Mauritania. 
Though it did not clain responsibility, it is believed 
that the attack on US consulate in Benghazi, Libya 
in 2012, that clained the life of US Ambassador, 
Christopher Stevens was the work of AQIM.
(27)
  
Current AQIM tactics and strategies include 
querilla warfare, kidnapping and suicide attacks.  
Its major source of income include ransome 
payments, illegal weapons, medication and drug 
smuggling. The organization is still expanding its 
activities, and getting involved in other conflict in 
Africa. J. Sterling believes that the group’s 
operation in unstable countries such as Libya and 
Nigeria will afford it easier movement and the 
dissemination of its influence.
(28)
 J. Masters appears 
to corroborate Sterling’s fears when he voices his 
concerns about AQIM’s connections with Nigerian 
Boko-Haram, Somali al-Shabaab and Yemeni Al-
Qaeda in Arab Peninsula (AQAP).
(29)
 
From the foregoing, it is axiomatic that we have 
not heard the last of AQIM. But, as we saw in the 
al-Shabaab onstaught, can this devastation and 
criminal mayhem compell governments to give in 
to AQIM objectives of establishing Islamic 
Caliphates across the Maghrebian Peninsula and in 
the Sahel region of Africa? Once again, we shall 
return to this. Meanwhile, we consider the West 
African Scenario. 
BOKO-HARAM IN WEST AFRICA 
From the analysis so far, it is evident that Boko 
Haram is to West Africa what al-Shabaab is to East 
Africa and the Horn; and AQIM to North Africa 
Terrorism and National Security in Africa: A Developmental Paradox, 1989-2014 
 
Asian Journal of Multidisciplinary Studies, 4(13) December, 2016 6 
and the Maghreb, respectively. We shall thus focus 
more or less on Boko-Haram if we are to catch a 
glimpse of the state of insurgency in West, and 
parts of central Africa. 
There is no agreement among commentators on the 
exact date or period that Boko Haram was founded. 
While Peresin and Zekulic assert that the group 
was founded “in 2000 during the civil war between 
the predominantly oil rich, Southern Christians and 
the northern poor, but bellicose Muslim tribes”, F. 
O. Ottoh dates the public phase of Boko Haram to 
2002, though he believes that the group has been in 
existence since the 1960’s.(30) Others have gone 
further to date the origin of the sect back to 
1995”,(31) when according to them, Abubakar 
Lawan established the Ahlusunna wal’jama’ah 
hijira sect at the university of Maiduguri, Borno 
State.
(31)
 It is believed that the group flourished as a 
non-violent movement until Muhammed Yusuf 
assumed leadership of the sect in 2002. From this 
period on, the group metamorphosed into a 
militant, insurgent and violent extremist Muslim 
sect under various names: the Mahajirun, 
Yusufiyyah, Nigerian Taliban, Boko Haram and 
Jama’atu Ahlissunnah Lidda’ awatiwal Jihad. 
According to Ferdinand Ottoh, the group began 
with a semblance of a terrorist group, gathering its 
members in a Mosque in the north-east, and 
seeking to implement a separatist community under 
Wahhabi principles.
(32)
 Having been founded as a 
Sunni Islamic fundamentalist sect advocating a 
strict form of Sharia Law, it subsequently 
developed into a Salafist jihad group in 2009, 
having been influenced by the Wahhabi 
movement.
(33)
 Despite this, its ideological plank 
remained Sunni Islamist, which seeks to abolish the 
secular system of government and to impliment 
Wahhabi interpretations of Sharia in Nigeria.  To 
achieve this, Boko-Haram proclaimed its goals: 
overthrowing the Nigerian government, creating a 
true Islamic state and enforcing Sharia law.
(34)
 
Perhaps, we may need to give some historical 
insight into the background to this goal.  It is 
submitted that Boko Haram was conceived on the 
basis of previous Islamic revival experiences in 
Nigeria.  This explains its main affiliation to the 
Jama’t Izalat al Bid’a Wa Iqamat as Sunnal 
(Society of Removal of Innovation and 
Reestablishment of the Sunna) known as Izala 
Oryan Izal.  This is a Wahhabi, anti-Sufi movement 
establishment in 1978 by Sheikh Ismaila Idris in 
Jos.
(35) 
On another plank, Boko Haram insurgency 
in Nigeria can be traced back to the aspirations of 
the great medieval Kanuri dominated Kanem – 
Borno Empire. It will be recalled that prior to 
Nigerian independence in 1960, a pan-Kanuri 
nationalist movement had sought to assert Kanuri 
interests as part of the broader anti-colonial 
struggle. The movement called for “Greater 
Kanowra” territory that included Cameroon’s 
Extreme North Region, Niger’s Departments of 
Zinder and Diffa, and the prefectures of Lac and 
Kanem in Chad.
(36) 
It is significant that this greater 
Kanuri region – North-Eastern Nigeria, Northern 
Cameroon, South-Eastern Niger, and South-
Western Chad, constitute the extended base of 
Boko-Harm activity. This has further provided 
Boko-Haram with a corridor to infilterate and be 
infilterated, benefit and network with international 
terrorist organizations – through Chad to Sudan and 
al-Shabaab in Somalia, through Niger to the 
adjacent Touareg regions of Mali, Southern Libya 
and Algeria. 
With this networking, it is observed that the 
fundamental objective of the sect, which as we 
indicated earlier, is to overthrow the Nigerian State 
and establish a strict Islamic rule by Sharia law”, 
appear to have expanded to include al-Qaeda 
strategies of global jihad directed against Western 
interests.  Publishing a video-message in July 2010, 
and announcing and expressing solidarity with al-
Qaeda, Boko-Haram declared that its attacks will 
henceforth begin to target American and Western 
interests in Nigeria. 
Once again, like other terrorist organizations in 
other regions of Africa, Boko-Haram is faced with 
internal turbulence within its factions. Unable to 
adopt a single collective future strategy, one faction 
supports the continuation of exclusively local 
operations, focusing on the overthrow of the 
Nigerian State, the other leans towards the 
strengthening of their alliance with other jihadist 
groups in other regions, under over all al-Qaeda 
leadership
.(37)
 It is difficult for Boko-Haram to 
disavow support and assistance from other terror 
organizations.  Since it is reported to have not only 
drawn members from such countries as Niger, 
Northern Cameroon, Chad and the Sudan amongst 
other places, it also receives assistance, training 
and logistics from al-Qaeda in Afghanistan, AQIM 
in Algeria, Mali and Mauritania; and Somali Al-




On a closer look however, it would appear that 
there is no contradiction between a local agenda of 
overthrowing a sitting regime, and replacing it with 
an Islamic caliphate, and pursuing a word-wide 
campaign against Western interests. Al-Qaeda aims 
to establish a word-wide Muslim Calipliate.  This 
has the support of many Muslims.  It invokes the 
golden age of Islamic Civilization and it is helping 
to mobilize support for al-Qaeda among the most 
traditional Muslims – the (Sufi Order), while 
concealing the fact that al-Qaeda’s leaders envision 
a restored caliphate that would be a totalitarian 
state, reminiscent of a pre-2002 Taliban regime in 
Afghanistan. It should not surprise anyone that 
Boko-Haram insurgent group in Nigeria has a link 
and support of both al-Qaeda and the Sunni – 
Inspired Islamic State (ISIS). A glimpse into ISIS-
controlled terriroties reveals what the caliphate 
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agenda of al-Qaeda and Boko-Haram around the 
world, and in Nigeria respectively, will look like. 
The question once again is, how feasible is the 
caliphate agenda both in the local and international 
environment? Will the maximization of fear, 
Kidnapping, detonating of bombs in public places 
and buildings, aircraft highjackings and blow-ups, 
suicide attacks, and other forms of insurgent / 
terrorist strategies cause governments in the 
domestic and international arena to acquiesce, and 
hand over power to insurgents or terrorists, or 
cause the state to collapse, so that insurgents will 
simply walk in and seize power? In Nigeria, we are 
told that the immediate aim of Boko-Haram is to 
overthrow the Nigerian State, (not the 
government), because governments come and go, 
but they pledge to uphold the constitution and 
preserve and maintain Nigeria’s territorial 
inviolability. So, there must be a state collapse first, 
before any form of Islamic caliphate can be 
imposed.  It must be realized that the terrorists / 
insurgents, whichever they prefer to be addressed, 
live within the state, not in outerspace.  If there 
would be a state collapse, they cannot be immune 
from its consequences. Before we conclude, there 
may be need to look at the consequences of 
terrorism on the African political economy. 
Socio Economic Consequences of Terrorism on 
Africa 
As it has become evident from the preceding 
analysis, terrorists aim to coerce governments to 
concede to their demands.  This is succinctly 
captured by Khusrav Gaibulloev and Todd Sandler 
when they wrote: in their bid to force government 
to concede to their demands, terrorists plan attacks 
that have adverse consequences on targeted 
countries economies.
(39)
 They further observe that 
terrorist hope that economic costs when combined 
with human losses, will pressure besieged 
governments to concede to their political demands.  
It is in this context that we note the penchant of 
modern day terrorist to want to damage bus 
stations, airports; Stock Exchanges, transport 
systems, hotels, tourist centres etc. In Africa 
examples and instances abound where terrorists 
have targeted economic infrastructures and 
facilities – Luxor massacre of tourists on 17 
November 1979 at Hatshepsut’s Temple in Egypt, 
the Car-bombing of the Israeli owned Paradise 
Hotel in Mombasa, Kenya on 28 November 2002, 
the Westgate Shopping Mall attack in Nairobi, 
Kenya, numerous attacks on hotels and tourist 
centres in Mogadishu, Somalia, attacks on markets, 
motor parks & shopping centres in Nigeria by 
Boko-Haram, just to mention but a few. 
Studies have shown that terrorism can negatively 
influence targeted country’s economic growth 
through a number of channels.
(40)
 Terrorist attacks 
may enhance uncertainty which limits investments 
and diverts Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) to 
safer venues, augmented security outlays by a 
targeted government may crowd out productive 
public and private investment, terrorist campaign 
raises the cost of doing business through higher 
wages, larger insurance premiums, and greater 
security expenditures, which in turn, decrease 
profits, productivity and growth. Disruption to 
transportation, communication, and electricity 
infrastructure may have short term dire economic 
consequences. Terrorism impacts specific 
industries - airlines, tourism. Terrorism may cause 
donor countries to curtail foreign assistance owing 
to stability  concerns.
(41)
 Largely corroborating, 
Sandler and Enders aver that terrorist incidents 
have economic consequences by diverting Foreign 
Direct Investment (FDI), destroying infrastructure, 




Focusing on Africa, we refer to the preamble of the 
Algiers Convention of 1999, which emphasizes the 
economic consequences of terrorism for the 
African continent by the following statement: 
terrorism constitutes a serious violation of human 
rights and impedes socio-economic development 
through destabilization of states.
(43)
 In support of 
this assertion Jakkie Cilliers reiterates that the 
common denominator in terrorism remains the 
intimidation of particular economic political 
system.
(44)
 Still corroborating, M. Levitsky argues 
that the new war should be seen in five 
interconnected battle fields: diplomatic- political, 
economic – financial, law enforcement, intelligence 
and military.
(45)
 All these appear to confirm that 
terrorism indeed does have economic 
consequences. 
It is indeed trite that terrorism potentially has 
adverse impacts on economic growth, investment, 
and tourism in Africa, as elsewhere.  Using the 
“Terrorism Knowledge Base”, researchers have 
made several empirical estimates based on cross-
sectional and period fixed effects, and generally 
found that there is a negative correlation between 
terrorism and real Gross Domestic Product (GDP).  
It is found that the higher the number of terrorist 
incident, the lower the GDP. Additionally, GDP 
seems to be particularly sensitive in an adverse way 
to terrorist target type – Airports, transportation 
infrastructure, private citizens, and property.
(46)
 
Additional evidence for the adverse economic 
consequences of terrorism has been provided by 
Blomberg and Orphanides.
(47)
 They found that the 
incidence of terrorism is negative and significantly 
related to GDP growth and foreign direct 
investment. According to them, African countries 
have experienced a high economic cost due to 
activities of Ansaru and Boko-Haram. The two 
groups linked to Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb 
have waged a brutal campaign against military, 
government, and civilian targets, including 
Christians.  For developing countries such as 
Nigeria and Kenya, the activities of these groups 
make the investment environment unfriendly, as 
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investors shy away because of compromised safety 
and weak national security. 
The increase in terrorist incidents in countries such 
as Kenya and Nigeria, two of Africa’s largest 
economies – could render them less attractive for 
FDI; causing their economies to shrink.  There is 
indeed evidence to suggest that in the case of Boko 
Haram, a jihadist terrorist organization in Nigeria, 
the increase in the number of terrorist incident 
attributed to them in recent times have contributed 
to FDI decline from US $8.28 billion in 2009 to US 
$6. 1 billion in 2010; a 36 percent decline.
(48)
 The 
figure at present should be even lesser, as evident 
by current economic difficulties facing the nation. 
Boko-Haram is located in the northern part of the 
country, which has the highest poverty rate in the 
country. 
Table 1 Zonal incidence of poverty in Nigeria by different poverty measures (percentage of  population) 
Zone Food poor Absolute poor Relative poor Dollars per day 
North Central 38,6 59,5 67,5 59,7 
North East 51,5 69,0 76,3 69,1 
North West 51,8 70,0 77,7 70,4 
South East 41,0 58,7 67,0 59,2 
South South 35,5 55,9 63,8 56,1 
South West 25,4 49,8 59,1 50,1 
Sources: Ogbonnaya, Ogujiuba & Stiegler, Terrorism in Nigeria, 149. 
This region has remained relatively unsafe as it is 
the region experiencing the highest number of 
terrorist incidents, thereby making it difficult for 
inflow of FDI. Investment in counterterrorism may 
be beneficial in countering terrorism, but it can be 
costly. It is observed that at least, for some African 
countries, counterterrorism and security 
expenditures are rather too high for countries such 
as Algeria, Burundi, Nigeria, Egypt, Somalia, and 
Congo DRC, which rank high with respect to the 
number of terrorist incidents. Recent history has 
shown that an average of 30 percent of their GDP 
is being spent on efforts to combat terrorism and 
other threats to national security.
(49)
 
If this trend countinues, it is argued that terrorists 
may achieve the goals of terrorism in different 
African regions. Some commentators have 
provided reasons why they think this may be 
feasible. Using the West African Sub-region, as a 
reference point to the rest of Africa, they contend 
that: 1 it is a particularly underdeveloped sub-
region recovering from several years of prolonged 
conflict, and characterized by extended periods 
when state authority is weak and transnational 
criminals exercise control over pockets of territory, 
2 its relative proximity by sea to Latin America for 
transshipment of Latin American drug cartels 
which the terrorist organization exploit for 
clandestine underground economy, 3 the 
prevalence of inter ethno-religious conflicts that 
create divisions that terrorist groups can, and do 
take advantage of.
(49)
 It is equally indicated that 
because the terrorist organizations are collaborating 
and networking, the political economy, national 
security, sovereignty and territoriality of states in 
Africa is in clear jeopardy. 
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
We need to remind ourselves that the immediate 
goals of the various terrorist organizations 
operating in parts of the African continent have 
been to overthrow either the state or particular 
sitting governments, and establish a theocratic 
government on the basis of strict implementation of 
Islamic Sharia law.  Thus, Boko Haram seeks to 
overthrow the government or force a state collapse 
in Nigeria that will enable it to establish an Islamic 
State, AQIM seeks to overthrow the democratic 
government and establish an Islamic State in 
Algeria, and the Sahel region, al-Shabaab seeks to 
overthrow the Transitional Federal Government 
(TFG) in Somalia, and in its stead, set up an 
Islamic State, the Islamist Ansar Dine (Defenders 
of the Faith), to which the National Movement for 
the Liberation of Azawad (WNLA) rebels in Mali 
lost control of the struggle for the creation of 
Tuareg state (Azawad), seeks to establish a 
sovereign and independent Islamic State 
comprising the northern regions of Kidal, Gao and 
Timbuktu and institute a harsh form of Islamic law. 
Each of these organizations has been infiltrated by 
global Juhadist organizations – al-Qaeda, ISIS – 
with global objectives of confronting American and 
Western power and civilization, and ultimately 
supplanting them with Islamic and Eastern / Arabic 
civilization.  The way to achieve this is by 
recruiting, training Islamic zealots to carry out 
criminal activities that is abhorred by every decent 
mind on planet earth.  Lives will be cost, 
economies may go through straits, societies may be 
dislocated and displaced but the lesson of history 
remains sacrosanct – Evil will never triumph over 
good. 
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